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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE ITINERANT MERCHANT
Resident retail merchants long have sought and obtained legisla-
tive preference and advantage over non-resident competitors. Directed
first at peddlers and itinerant merchants and later at national chains,
the legislative protection generally has failed to create sufficient eco-
nomic advantage and so the demand for further legislation continues.
Questions of constitutionality arise under both the federal and the
state constitutions.
Non-discriminatory licenses imposed on peddlers, transient mer-
chants, merchant truckers, and various other merchandising outlets'
have been upheld either under the power of taxation or under the
police power.2 The United States Supreme Court approved such a
license tax in 1868.3 Two years later a patently discriminatory license
tax based on residence was held invalid as a violation of the privileges
and immunities clause.4 Then in Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District,
the Court facing a similar discriminatory license tax failed to invoke
the privileges and immunities clause and instead held that the statute
as applied to a drummer was invalid on the ground that Congress had
an exclusive power over interstate commerce.5 This decision established
a distinction between peddler and drummer; the former carrying his
goods with him, the latter soliciting orders for subsequent interstate
delivery.6 This distinction based on time and manner of delivery of
the merchandise seems unsound, particularly in the light of recent
sales tax cases.7 But it has resulted in a competitive advantage to
the non-resident manufacturer selling goods through peddler merchan-
disers over resident retailers and non-resident distributors using other
distributive methods. Such decisions indicate the capacity of federal
intervention to create as well as remove trade barriers.8
The more important result of the R.obbins case is that the com-
merce clause has become the sole protection in the federal courts
against discriminatory legislation either as to persons or goods.9
Some state courts hold a discriminatory tax violative of the privileges
1 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) 42-401. For study of comparative
legislation, see AIARKTING LAWS SURVEY WPA (1939). For the
purposes of this comment, statutes and municipal ordinances are
not distinguished.
2 Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895), South Bend v. Martin, 142
Ind. 31, 41 N. E. 315 (1895).
3"Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868).
1 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (U. S. 1870).
G Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1886).
0 This distinction has been maintained through the years. Emert v.
Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 (1895); Real Silk Mills v. Portland, 268
U. S. 325 (1924). But cf. Town of Sellersburg v. Stanforth, 209
Ind. 229, 198 N. E. 437 (1935), (1936) 12 Ind. L. J. 70.
7 Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 617.
8 See, McAllister, Courts, Congress, and Barriers, supra, p. 144.
0 New York State v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 (1898).
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and immunities clause1o That clause, however, provides no protec-
tion to the foreign corporation engaging in intrastate business."
Some states have attempted to exclude peddler merchandising
through prohibitive license taxes.' 2 A more successful approach is
the city ordinance declaring peddling and soliciting without an express
invitation a public nuisance."3 Such prohibition is attacked generally
as an unreasonable exercise of the police power' 4 and in the case of
the drummer as a violatioi of the commerce clause.
Although direct burdens on interstate commerce are invalid, in-
cidental burdens resulting from the states' exercise of its police or
taxing power are permitted. 5 Thus, a license tax which exempts
manufacturers located within the state has been sustained.16 Although
a discrimination results, it is sustained for an accumulation of reasons:
the tax is on the business rather than the goods; 1 T the inequality is
compensated for by a consideration of the entire tax system;' s the
complaint is usually a foreign corporation;19 there is no evidence of
an intent to discriminate.2 0
The Supreme Court has refused to invoke the equal protection
clause against discriminatory license taxes. If the discrimination is
10 Smith v. Farr, 46 Colo. 364, 104 Pac. 401 (1909), State v. Cohen, 133
Me. 293, 177 A. 403 (1935).
- Doctrine of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868). This problem is
beyond the scope of this comment.
12 Carrollton v. Bazette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N. E. 837 (1896), People v.
Rawley. 231 Mich. 374, 204 N. W. 137 (1925).
'13 Town of Green River, Wyoming v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F (2d) 112
(C.C.A. 10th, 1933) reversing 60 F (2d) (D. Wyo. 1932). The
court construed the ordinance as aimed at the "place" of solicitation
rather than the act and therefor any regulation of interstate com-
merce is merely incidental. Also that the ordinance was not such
an arbitrary use of the police power as would cause the court to
override legislative discretion. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50
Wyo. 52, 58 P (2d) 456 (1936); McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P (2d)
969 (Colo. 1939). Sawyer, Federal Restraint on the State's Power
to Regulate House to House Selling (1934) 6 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 85.
14 In N. J. Good Humor v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11 A (2d)
113 (1940) the court said, "it is not within the bounds of reason
to prohibit particular classes of business, lawful in themselves,
for the enrichment of another class. Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181
S. C. 143, 186 S. E. 783 (1936); Prior v. White, 131 Fla. 1, 180 So.
147, 116 A.L.R. 1176, 1189 (1938); accord but distinguishable be-
cause discriminatory: Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air, 172 Md. 536,
192 Atl. 417 (1937); White v. Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S. E. (2d)
269 (1939).
15WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) ch. XI.
16 New York State v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 (1898); Reymann Brewing
Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. at 445 (1900); Armour & Co. v. Virginia,
246 U. S. 1 (1917).
17 New York State v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, 664 (1898). But cf. Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875).
Is New York State v. Robert, 171 U. S. 658, 664 (1898).
19 Id. at 665.
20 This is a value judgment and only in an extreme case will the court
look beyond the statute. Minn. v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1889).
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interstate the commerce clause applies. If it is intrastate, the court
will not invalidate the tax, for the fact it "discriminates in favor
of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination
is founded upon a reasonable distinction."21 State courts 'on the
other hand using the federal equal protection clause have held in-
valid license taxes discriminating on the basis of residence.22 Here
as elsewhere, a legal discrimination does not exist if the legislatve
classification is reasonable. Thus, a license tax on all peddlers ex-
cept residents is clearly an invalid discrimination under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,23 or the privileges and
immunities clause of the state constitution.24 A license tax on all
peddlers excepting established merchants if interpreted to permit
established merchants to peddle must fall for the same reasons. 25
But if it is interpreted as a classification of two modes of merchan-
dising, it is a reasonable classification although it may create a
geographcal discrimination and barrier. This anomaly is explained on
the ground that the discrimination does not relate to persons in the
same class but only between classes. It is merely imposing a just
proportion of the burden of government upon a class of occupations or
persons which otherwise would not be licensed or taxed.26 Yet, if
courts look beyond the form of the statute, they would discover a
discrimination based on residence alone.27 And this discrimination
frequently creates a burden on interstate trade2 s and may result in a
barrier to interstate trade.29
2' Board of Tax Comm'rs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537, 73 A.L.R.
1464, 1481 (1930).
22 Hughes v. Rudd, 178 La. 588, 152 S. 300 (1934) ; State v. Cohen, 133
Me. 293, 177 AtI. 403 (1935).2
3 Rodgers v. Kent Circuit Judge, 115 Mich. 441, 73 N. W. 381 (1897).
Notes (1929) 61 A. L. R. 337, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 63.
21 State v. Cohen, 133 Me. 293, 177 Atl. 403 (1935); Ideal Tea Co. v.
Salem, 77 Ore. 182, 150 Pac. 852 (1915).
5Whipple v. South Milwaukee, 218 Wis. 395, 261 N. W. 235 (1935);
Ideal Tea Co. v. Salem, 77 Ore. 182, 150 Pac. 852 (1915).
2 Martin v. Rosedale, 130 Ind. 109, 29 N. E. 410 (1891); Campbell
Baking Co. v. Harrisonville, 50 F (2d) 670 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931);
American Bakeries Co. v. Sumter, 173 S. C. 94, 174 S. E. 919 (1934)
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in 293
U. S. 523 (1934).
27 Campbell Baking Co. v. Maryville, Mo., 31 F (2d) 466 (W. D. Mo.
1929).
28 "The fact is that the purpose of this ordinance, masquerading in the
guise of a revenue measure, and thinly veiled, is to cause the
appellant to cease selling its products to merchants in Harrisonville
in competition with local producers . . . . The real question is
whether there is to be freedom of trade and barter between citizens
of different communities in the same state, as there is between those
of different states, or whether such business activities are to be
hampered and in effect prohibited by unreasonable and arbitary
exactions under color of legitimate taxation." See Campbell Baking
Co. v. Harrisonville, 50 F. (2d) 670, 681 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931) (Dis-
senting Opinion).
29For example a license tax on peddlers of farm produce imposed by
an urban state is not discriminatory in form but may require the
249
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The constitutionality of these discriminatory statutes is uncer-
tain in Indiana.80 In Sears v. Board of Comm'wrs, our court sustained
such legislations' on the basis of a decision later reversed by the
United States Supreme Court.32 The federal privileges and immuni-
ties clause was held to apply to persons or property only and as this
was a privilege tax it was outside the constitutional limitation.33 The
court held inapplicable the state privileges and immunities clause on
the ground that it applied only to Indiana citizens and did not protect
non-residents.3"
Since this decision no statute has been involved in litigation, but
several municipal ordinances have been questioned. The doctrine of
the Robbins case was followed in municipal ordinance cases, until
1935,35 when in Sellersburg v. Stanforth,36 the court upheld a license
tax on peddlers in Indiana who filled their orders subsequently in
Kentucky, the court holding that peddling was an intrastate business.
The exemption of farm produce or farmers peddling their own
produce37 is a common exemption in the license tax statutes. A ma-
jority of the courts hold such statutes unconstitutional as a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.38 Where
suppliers of farm products produced in adjoining states to be
marketed through resident merchants in the regulating state.
Although the burden seems to be imposed uniformly upon a class
of persons and upon a class of goods, the effect is to place a burden
which is co-extensive with states lines and which may therefore be
called a barrier.
So MD. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) 42-201; 42-501. (License tax on non-
residents but none on residents).
8'36 Ind. 267 (1871).82 Ward v. Maryland, 9 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.), 424, rev'd 12 Wall. 418
(U.S. 1870).
88 In Grafty v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 8 N. E. 609 (1886) an ordinance
discriminating on the basis of counties was invalidated under the
state privileges and immunities clause and the court declared the
ordinance in violation of the federal constitution under both the
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause. This
decision would seem to have overruled Sears v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 36
Ind. 267 (1871) but for South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 41 N. E.
315 (1895) which approved the Grafty case, supra, on the state
constitution but not as to the federal constitution as no interstate
commerce was involved in that case.
a1 But cf. Grafty v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 8 N. E. 609 (1886) ; South
Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 41 N. E. 315 (1895).
85 The term peddler includes a solicitor under Indiana statutes. Fallis
v. Gas City, 169 Ind. 508, 82 N. E. 1056 (1907). The following
cases exempt the solicitor from state regulation if interstate de-
livery is subsequent to the sale: Martin v. Rosedale, 130 Ind. 109,
29 N. E. 410 (1891); South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 41 N. E.
315 (1895); and Huntington v. Mahan, 142 Ind. 695, 42 N. E. 463
(1895).
86 209 Ind. 229, 198 N. E. 437 (1935), (1936) 12 Ind. L. J. 70.
8 7 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY WPA (1939).
88State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N. W. 313 (1939), (1940) 38
Mich. L. Rev. 544; Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417(1937). Contra: People v. De Blaay, 137 Mich. 402, 100 N. W. 598
(1904); cf. St. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 84 S. W. 914 (1904).
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the minority view prevails, modern transportation facilities and retail
practices make these statutes effective interstate barriers against the
importation of produce from other states.39
Transient merchant legislation4o generally is similar to the
peddler, drummer, and merchant trucker legislation already discussed;
but a peculiar Indiana interpretation of this legislation should be
noted. Although the statute is non-discriminatory in form the court
has held the statute inapplicable to transient merchants who also have
a fixed place of business within the county." Thus, giving, in fact,
an advantage to the local merchant. If the court should interpret the
statute similarly on a state-wide basis to the disadvantage of out
of state licensees the statute would become a true barrier statute-
and probably in violation of the equal protection clause as inter-
preted by some state courts.
Barriers in the field of itinerant merchandising are created most
frequently through discriminatory enforcement. And this unfortunately
can seldom be redressed in the courts.42 Thus, in these fields perhaps
more than in others there is real substance to the trade barrier thesis.
Discrimination arising from state and municipal legislation, aggravated
by the bias of local enforcing authorities, effectively prevents equal
competition. The persons involved are seldom financially able to liti-
gate the discriminations and so they remain and multiply.43
W.S.H.
29 Nebraska although regulating the merchant trucker exempts farmers
peddling their own produce. Neb. L. (1939) ch. 101.
40 The term "transient merchant" generally distinguishes the temporary
merchant who occupies a building for the sale of his goods. Defini-
tions are impractical, however, as all the terms are used inter-
changeably according to the particular state involved.
4' Harding & Miller Music Co. v. Cushman, Treas., 183 Ind. 218, 108
N. E. 865 (1915).
42 The mere fact that a law or ordinance has not been enforced against
other persons is no defense to the person against whom it is being
enforced. Mackay Tele. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U. S. 94
(1918) ; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632 (1907).
But see, Cumberland) Coal Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 284 U. S. 23(1931); Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1933).
Relief is granted from intentional systematic discrimination in
tax assessments. Quare, Whether this approach may be used to
eliminate the administrative induced trade barrier?
43Even against the national distributive organizations the legislative
power of the local merchant has been strong. This has been partic-
ularly apparent in the municipal ordinance field. See, Sikes and
Parrish, supra p. 220. Even much state legislation is asserted to
have unseen barrier effect. For example, gross income taxation
with low basic exemptions which favor small over large merchandiz-
ing units; unfair trade acts with increasingly large markups for
operating costs; anti-discrimination and loss leader statutes with
arbitrary price definitions.
